The Evolution of Organizational Conventions and Gains from Diversity
用一个高度抽象的演化博弈模型，研究不同组织惯例的演化机制，以及自由贸易、整合、实验、模仿和企业家远见在探索组织多样性收益中的作用。
This paper investigates, by using a highly abstract evolutionary game model, the mechanism of evolution of different organizational conventions, as well as roles of free trade, integration, experiments, emulation and entrepreneurial foresight for exploring gains from organizational diversity. It focuses on an aspect of organization as a voluntary association of economic agents trying to overcome the bounds of their rationality, scope of action and competence, rather than as an ‘instrument’ for entrepreneurial maximizing behavior, and identifies two generic forms of organization as an information system. The paper concludes by discussing the relevance of the evolutionary game model for understanding actual organizational evolutionary processes in North America and Japan.