Experience and Brokerage in Asset Markets: Evidence from Art Auctions
研究艺术品拍卖中，具有特定艺术家经验的中介（拍卖行）更能促成交易并提供更准确的估价，说明特定市场经验有助于减少信息不对称带来的流动性不足和透明度问题。
Abstract Focusing on the art market, where auction houses act as brokers between art sellers and buyers, we investigate whether more experienced brokers achieve better performance as information providers and matchmakers. We find that houses with artist‐specific experience are more likely to achieve a sale and provide more precise pre‐sale estimates. These findings suggest that experience in a specific market segment plays an important role for brokers to reduce illiquidity and opacity in markets with asymmetric information. Our analysis also shows that specific experience matters above and beyond other house‐specific factors, including reputation and market power.