Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points
在对称独立私人价值框架下，假设投标人具有基于参考点的效用，其中保留价（最低出价）作为参考点，研究第二价格和第一价格拍卖。与通常结果不同，卖家的最优保留价随投标人数增加而上升。
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independentprivate values framework. We modify the standard model by theassumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where the reserveprice (minimum bid) plays the role of the reference point. In contrast to theusual result, the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number ofbidders. Even if an individual bidder perceives only a very small utility losswhen he has to pay more than the reserve price, the impact on the optimalreserve price can be strong when there are many bidders.