Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions
在统一价格拍卖中引入价格和数量的离散性，证明通过选择足够小的价格最小变动单位和足够大的数量倍数，可以任意减小定价过低问题，并探讨修改分配规则对收入的影响。
In uniform auctions, buyers chosse demand schedules as strategies and the same "market clearing" price for units awarded. Despite the widespread use of these auctions, the extant theory shows that they are susceptible to arbitrarily large underpricing. We make a realistic modification to the theory by letting prices, quantities, and bids be discrete. We show that underpricing can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a sufficiently small price tick size and a sufficiently large quantitity multiple. We also show how one might improve revenues by modifying the allocation rule. A trivial change in the design can have a dramatic impact on prices. Our conclusions are robust to bidders being capacity constrained. Finally, we examine supply uncertainty robust equilibria.