Does Political Corruption Impede Firm Innovation? Evidence from the United States
研究美国地方政治腐败对企业创新的影响，发现腐败严重地区的企业专利活动更少，原因在于腐败增加了企业被勒索的风险并降低了竞争威胁，从而削弱了创新动力。
Abstract We examine how local political corruption affects firm innovation in the United States. We find that firms located in highly corrupt areas are less innovative as measured by their patenting activities. The results are robust to the inclusion of a broad set of regional characteristics, instrumental variable analysis, matching analysis, difference-in-differences test, and alternative proxies for local corruption. Further analysis shows that reduced innovation incentives due to high extortion risk and decreased threat of competition could be the possible economic channels through which corruption affects innovation. Overall, our results indicate that local political corruption impedes corporate innovation in the United States.