Openness, Open Source, and the Veil of Ignorance
研究了为何追求利润的企业会自愿共享代码，提出开源许可在行业整体利润上优于允许首个创新者自由选择许可方式，从无知之幕视角解释了开源合作的合理性。
Abstract: Open source collaborations are increasingly among commercial rms whose interest is pro t. Why would pro t-motivated rms voluntarily share code? One reason is that cost reductions can outweigh increases in rivalry. This is especially persuasive when the contributors make complementary products. However, cost reductions do not explain why open source is a more pro table way of sharing than other forms of licensing. Why would rms use an in exible contract like the GPL? I present a model that shows how open source licensing can lead to higher industrywide pro t than would result if a rst innovator could choose the most pro table license once it nds itself in the position of rst innovator. From behind a veil of ignorance, that is, not knowing which rm will be rst, open source licensing creates higher expected pro t for the industry as a whole, and thus for each rm, than if rst innovators were allowed to choose. In the 1990's, open-source collaborations emerged as a new way of organizing software development (Eric S. Raymond, 1999). In an open-source collaboration, members disclose