Auditor Actions and the Deterrence of Manager Opportunism: The Importance of Communication to the Board and Consistency with Peer Behavior
通过多项实验，研究发现审计师增加审查并与董事会沟通能有效威慑管理者使用真实盈余管理，但仅在管理者决策与同行不一致时有效；单独增加审查无法威慑真实盈余管理，甚至可能诱发更多此类行为。
ABSTRACT Informed by Perceptual Deterrence Theory, we conduct multiple experiments to investigate when and how auditor actions can help deter manager opportunism. In Study 1A, we find that managers are less likely to use real earnings management (REM) when they expect auditors to both increase scrutiny and communicate their observations to the board. However, this effect occurs only when managers' operational decisions are inconsistent (versus consistent) with peer behavior. Study 1B findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny alone (without auditor-board communication) is not likely to deter REM. In Study 2, we find that increased auditor scrutiny with communication to the board effectively deters both accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and REM, reducing the total level of manager opportunism. However, without communication, increased auditor scrutiny deters AEM, but also induces more REM. Our findings highlight the importance of auditor-board communication and demonstrate how auditor actions can contribute to the deterrence of manager opportunism. Data Availability: Contact the authors.