Selfishness Need Not Be Bad
研究了自私路由在交通模型中的无效率度量——无政府价格（PoA），发现当总需求增大时PoA趋近于1，并通过北京交通数据验证了这一规律。
The price of anarchy (PoA) is a standard measure for the inefficiency of selfish routing in the static Wardrop traffic model. Empirical studies and a recent analysis reveal a surprising property that the PoA tends to one when the total demand T gets large. These results are extended by a new framework for the limit analysis of the PoA in arbitrary nonatomic congestion games that apply to arbitrary growth patterns of T and all regularly varying cost functions. For routing games with Bureau of Public Road (BPR) cost functions, the convergence follows a power law determined by the degree of the BPR functions, and a related conjecture need not hold. These findings are confirmed by an empirical analysis of traffic in Beijing.