A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders
研究内部人比外部股东更了解收入时，企业如何通过调整产出和支付来平滑收入与股利，并发现内部持股比例越低，产出不足越严重，形成“外部股权拉弗曲线”。
We develop a theory of income and payout smoothing by firms when insiders know more about income than outside shareholders, but property rights ensure that outsiders can enforce a fair payout. Insiders set payout to meet outsiders' expectations and underproduce to manage future expectations downward. The observed income and payout process are smooth and adjust partially and over time in response to economic shocks. The smaller the inside ownership, the more severe underproduction is, resulting in an "outside equity Laffer curve."