Structural Estimation of a Principal-Agent Model: Moral Hazard in Medical Insurance
估计了一个委托代理模型，近似得到最优合同，发现自付费用随治疗成本呈凹形变化，并考虑了收入效应后估计道德风险导致的福利损失，还提出了基于可签约与不可签约变量条件相关性的道德风险新度量。
Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditional correlation between contractible and noncontractible variables.