MERGER, EASE OF ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN A DYNAMIC MODEL
通过动态模型分析合并的反竞争效应，发现快速进入使合并更可能出于效率而非市场势力，但降低进入成本可能激励企业通过横向合并垄断行业，且反合并政策在存在进入威慑时可能降低福利。
We analyze whether ease and speed of entry can mitigate the anti‐competititve effects of a merger, in a dynamic model of endogenous merger. In our model, if new firms can enter quickly, it is more likely that merger is motivated by efficiency as opposed to increased market power. Thus, there is less reason to challenge the merger. On the other hand, if entry of new firms becomes less costly, firms may have a stronger incentive to monopolize the industry through horizontal merger. We also show that when the incumbent can engage in entry deterrence activities, anti‐merger policy can decrease welfare.