Inspection Intensity and Market Structure
研究如何为检查政策融资，同时允许执行市场法规。模型显示检查强度取决于市场结构：企业数量固定时，检查概率低于1，企业因正利润而合规；自由进入时，检查概率为1，通过固定费用防止过度进入。
An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms' incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection.