Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution
研究了一个多边议价博弈，委员会成员先投资共同项目再分配总产出，实验发现贡献接近完全效率，分配遵循按贡献比例公平原则，且多数情况下所有成员都获得支付而非最小获胜联盟。
I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low.