A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd‐Frank Reform Act of 2010
通过分析游说反对举报人条款的公司股价反应，发现投资者预期新条款能改善股东保护，带来净收益。
Abstract We evaluate the net costs and benefits of the whistleblower ( WB ) provisions adopted under the Dodd‐Frank Reform Act of 2010 by examining investor responses to events related to the proposed regulations. We focus our main analysis on a sample of firms that lobbied against implementation of the WB provisions by submitting a comment letter to the SEC . Lobbying firms are characterized by weaker existing WB programs and greater degrees of managerial entrenchment than a matched control sample of similar non‐lobbying firms. Short‐window excess stock returns around events related to implementation of the WB rules are significantly more positive for the portfolio of lobbying firms than for their matched controls; this effect is also more pronounced for lobbying firms with weaker existing WB programs. These results suggest that investors expect the new WB provisions to provide net benefits by improving shareholder protection.