Hard Marriage with Heavy Burdens: Organized Labor as Takeover Deterrents
利用工会选举的断点回归设计，发现劳动力权力增强会显著降低公司被收购的可能性、减少收购溢价和公告回报，并延长交易完成时间，对并购市场中的股东-员工冲突提供了新见解。
Abstract We examine how labor power affects a firm’s takeover exposure and merger gains. Using a regression discontinuity design that relies on “locally” exogenous variation in labor power generated by close-call union elections, we find that increased labor power significantly reduces a firm’s takeover exposure, reduces target offer premium and announcement returns, and prolongs deal completion duration. The results are stronger for more powerful and conflict-provoking unions. Bidders of unionized targets are experienced, are tough negotiators, and face fewer union threats by themselves. Our paper provides new insights into the real effects of shareholder-employee conflict regarding the market for corporate control. Received: February 9, 2019; editorial decision January 15, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.