Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision
研究了两个异质性代理人随时间共同贡献于一个联合项目并集体决定其规模的问题，发现效率高的代理人偏好更小规模，且偏好随时间不一致，效率程度是控制项目规模的关键因素。
Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project and collectively decide its scale. A larger scale requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scale, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent’s preferred scale shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent’s degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over the project scale. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.