Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits
研究了当冒险行为能揭示代理人决策能力、且只能用解雇作为激励工具时，委托人如何诱导代理人选择正确行动。发现委托人若能承诺替换策略，最优机制包括试用期后终身任职或随机替换；若不能承诺，任期限制可改善激励。
How can a principal (employer or voter) induce an agent (worker or politician) to choose the “right” actions if risky actions reveal the agent's decision-making competence and only dismissal can be used as an incentive instrument? We first show that if the principal can commit to a replacement strategy, then optimal mechanisms involve either (i) a probationary period and then indefinite tenure, or (ii) dismissing poorly performing agents but also randomly replacing agents who take nonrevealing actions. When the principal cannot commit, incentives can be improved by imposing term limits on agents.