Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Industry Consolidations
研究行业整合成功的影响因素，以首次公开募股时成立的整合型公司为样本，发现管理层和所有者继续参与经营能改善绩效，而发起人持股过高则降低绩效，凸显公司治理的作用。
This article studies the determinants of the success of industry consolidations using a unique sample of firms established at the time of their initial public offering: roll-up IPOs. In these transactions, small, private firms merge into a shell company, which goes public at the same time. These firms deliver poor stock returns; their operating performance mimics that of comparable firms but does not justify their high initial valuations. However, if the managers and owners of the firms included in the transaction remain involved in the business as shareholders and directors, operating and stock price performance improve, and future acquisitions are better received by the market. Higher ownership by the sponsor of the transaction leads to a reduction in performance, consistent with the view that the sponsor's compensation is excessive. These findings highlight the impact of corporate governance on performance. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.