Inflation Announcements and Social Dynamics
当企业通胀预期不同时，央行公告的效果受社会动态影响。模型解释了零利率下限国家难以提高通胀的原因，并预测突然的通胀目标会导致通胀低于目标，而渐进目标则不会，新实证证据支持这一预测。
Abstract We propose a new framework for understanding the effectiveness of central bank announcements when firms have heterogeneous inflation expectations. Expectations are updated through social dynamics and, with heterogeneity, not all firms choose to operate, putting downward pressure on realized inflation. Our model rationalizes why countries stuck at the zero lower bound have had a hard time increasing inflation without being aggressive. The same model also predicts that announcing an abrupt target to disinflate will cause inflation to undershoot the target, whereas announcing gradual targets will not. We present new empirical evidence that corroborates this prediction.