When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance
研究发现，劳动力通过持股获得公司治理发言权后，会推动企业偏离股东价值最大化，表现为投资减少、风险降低、增长放缓、就业和生产率下降。
Abstract Equity ownership gives labor both a fractional stake in a firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to other firms, labor-controlled publicly traded firms deviate more from value maximization, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. Therefore, we propose that labor uses its corporate governance voice to maximize the combined value of its contractual and residual claims, and that this often pushes corporate policies away from, rather than toward, shareholder value maximization.