Dynamic Mirrlees Taxation under Political Economy Constraints
研究在政治经济问题下动态非线性税收的结构，发现自利政治家设定的税收中，对政治家的激励与对个人的激励可以分离，并给出政治经济扭曲持续或消失的条件。
We study the structure of non-linear taxes in a dynamic economy subject to political economy problems. In contrast to existing literature, taxes are set by a self-interested politician, without any commitment power, who is partly controlled by the citizens. We prove that: (1) a version of the revelation principle applies; and (2) the provision of incentives to politicians can be separated from the provision of incentives to individuals. Using these results, we provide conditions under which distortions created by political economy problems persist or disappear. We then extend these results to environments with partially benevolent governments and potential <it>ex post</it> conflict among the citizens.