The Long‐Term Consequences of Short‐Term Incentives
研究发现，由股权归属衡量的短期激励会促使公司回购股票和进行并购，但这些行为随后导致长期回报为负和商誉减值，表明CEO可能为抬高股价以便出售自己持股。
ABSTRACT This paper studies the long‐term consequences of actions induced by vesting equity, a measure of short‐term incentives. Vesting equity is positively associated with the probability of a firm repurchasing shares, the amount of shares repurchased, and the probability of the firm announcing a merger and acquisition (M&A). However, it is also associated with more negative long‐term returns over two to three years following repurchases and four years following M&A, as well as future M&A goodwill impairment. These results are inconsistent with CEOs buying underpriced stock or companies to maximize long‐run shareholder value, but consistent with these actions being used to boost the short‐term stock price and thus equity sale proceeds. CEOs sell their own stock shortly after using company money to buy the firm's stock, also inconsistent with repurchases being motivated by undervaluation.