Financial Accounting Effects of Tax Aggressiveness: Contracting and Measurement
研究了企业将税务报告决策委托给税务经理时，如何通过财务会计指标来评估其表现，并比较了两种会计指标（现金税支付和未确认税收优惠）在区分保守与激进企业方面的效果。
Abstract This study examines a setting in which a tax‐reporting decision is delegated to a firm's tax manager. Using financial accounting measures of tax expense to evaluate the tax manager allows the firm to efficiently attain the level of tax avoidance it prefers, despite the fact that the consequences of the tax‐reporting decision will occur in the future. The study also examines how well two accounting measures of tax aggressiveness — cash taxes paid and the unrecognized tax benefit — distinguish between conservative and aggressive firms.