Macro Credit Policy and the Financial Accelerator
在金融加速器模型中研究宏观信贷政策,发现贷款合同是否具有股权特征(如指数化)决定了周期性贷款价值比税收的有效性。
This paper studies macro credit policies within the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The focus is on borrower‐based restrictions on lending such as loan‐to‐value (LTV) ratios. We find that the efficacy of cyclical taxes on LTV ratios depends upon the nature of the underlying loan contract. If the loan contract contains equity‐like features such as indexation to aggregate conditions, then there is little role for cyclical taxation. But if the loan contract is not indexed to aggregate conditions, then there are substantial gains to procyclical taxes on LTV ratios.