Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information
结合私人信息与俱乐部理论，将企业定义为技术与代理人组成的俱乐部，在一般均衡中内生形成多种类型，并证明福利与存在性定理，通过实例说明有限承诺和监督能力影响企业组织与均衡分布。
Using private information and club theories, this paper develops a theory of …rms in general equilibrium. Firms are de…ned to be assignments of technologies and agents to clubs. In equilibrium, …rms form endogenously and multiple types may co-exist. We formulate the general equilibrium problem as both a Pareto program and as a competitive equilibrium. Welfare and existence theorems are provided. In the competitive equilibrium, club memberships are priced and purchased, so the market determines which organizations exist as well as who is a member. Pareto optima and competitive equilibria of several examples are computed. In our examples, elements of limited commitment and monitoring capabilities are important factors that a¤ect both the internal organization of …rms and their equilibrium distribution. Further-more, equilibrium organizational structure varies with the aggregate endowment of capital and the distribution of wealth.