M&A Due Diligence, Post‐Acquisition Performance, and Financial Reporting for Business Combinations
研究发现竞争压力、短期财务报告激励和代理问题会导致收购方减少尽职调查，而尽职调查不足则与收购后盈利能力下降、商誉减值概率增加以及资产和负债公允价值估计质量降低相关。
ABSTRACT Before completing merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, acquiring firms conduct due diligence. This process provides acquiring firms with a more informed assessment of the expected costs, benefits, and risks of an acquisition and offers one last opportunity to renegotiate or terminate an M&A transaction. However, acquiring firms must trade off the costs and benefits of performing additional due diligence versus completing the acquisition. Based on an analysis of the time to negotiate the acquisition agreement and complete the transaction, I predict and find that competitive pressures, short‐term financial reporting incentives, and agency problems are associated with less due diligence. I also find that less due diligence is associated with lower post‐acquisition profitability, a higher probability of acquisition‐related goodwill impairments, and lower quality fair value estimates for the acquired assets and liabilities. These findings highlight due diligence as an important factor explaining cross‐sectional variation in post‐acquisition performance and financial reporting for business combinations.