Inferring Tax Compliance from Pass-Through: Evidence from Airbnb Tax Enforcement Agreements
利用Airbnb平台数据及其自愿代收代缴协议，研究发现执法前仅有不超过24%的交易纳税，且需求缺乏弹性导致税负主要由租客承担，执法对减少本地Airbnb活动效果有限。
Abstract Tax enforcement is especially costly when market participants are difficult to observe. The benefits of enforcement depend crucially on pre-enforcement compliance. We de rive an upper bound on pre-enforcement compliance from the pass-through of newly enforced taxes. Using data on Airbnb listings and the platform's voluntary collection agreements, we find that taxes are paid on, at most, 24% of Airbnb transactions prior to enforcement. We also find that demand for Airbnb listings is inelastic, driving three key insights: the tax burden falls disproportionately on renters, the excess burden is small, and tax enforcement is relatively ineffective at reducing local Airbnb activity.