Do managers perform better under EVA bonus schemes?
研究了基于EVA奖金计划的经理人是否比基于传统会计奖金计划的经理人表现更好，发现理解EVA概念的经理人表现更优，但部分绩效提升源于评估-奖励过程的一致性，且EVA效果因部门而异。
Economic Value Added (EVA) is a performance measure that is being used by an increasing number of companies, but academic research on EVA is limited. In addition, all prior empirical academic studies on EVA have used the firm as the unit of analysis. In this study, we examine the effect of EVA on the performance of individual managers. Specifically, we examine whether managers on EVA-based bonus plans outperform managers on traditional accounting-based bonus plans. We are able to test this because we have access to an EVA-focused company that has managers on both EVA and traditional bonus plans. Our results suggest that managers on EVA bonus plans who understand the EVA concept perform better than managers on traditional bonus plans. However, we find some evidence that the increase in performance results from increased consistency or congruence in the manager's evaluation–reward process rather than from superiority of EVA as a performance measure. Also, we find that the effect of EVA bonuses and EVA understanding differs depending on the area of the firm in which the manager is employed. This suggests that EVA may not be a universally appropriate base for reward systems. *Mohan Lal passed away 24 July 2002. This paper is dedicated to him.