模糊招募:模糊处方

AMBIGUOUS SOLICITATION: AMBIGUOUS PRESCRIPTION

Economic Inquiry · 2011
被引 9
ABS 3

中文导读

通过两阶段实验室实验,研究不同模糊程度的招募信息如何影响受试者参与率,发现模糊任务信息会不成比例地赶走模糊厌恶者,而详细任务信息则吸引他们,标准招募邮件则吸引非模糊厌恶者。

Abstract

We conduct a two‐phase laboratory experiment, separated by several weeks. In the first phase, we conduct urn games intended to measure ambiguity aversion on a representative population of undergraduate students. In the second phase, we invite the students back with four different solicitation treatments, varying in the ambiguity of information regarding the task and the payout of the laboratory experiment. We find that those who return do not differ from the overall pool with respect to their ambiguity aversion. However, no solicitation treatment generates a representative sample. The ambiguous task treatment drives away the ambiguity averse disproportionally and the detailed task treatment draws in the ambiguity averse disproportionally. Finally, the standard laboratory recruitment e‐mail disproportionately draws in those who are not ambiguity averse.

实验经济学行为经济学模糊厌恶样本选择