Managed Distribution Policies in Closed-End Funds and Shareholder Activism
研究了封闭式基金中管理分配政策（MDP）如何通过降低管理者对基金资产的索取权，在基金折价时增加股东价值，并作为管理者应对股东积极主义挑战的工具。
Abstract In closed-end funds, a managed distribution policy (MDP) is a dividend commitment potentially requiring the liquidation of assets. We argue that MDPs lower managerial claims on fund assets and, when the fund is at a discount, increase shareholder value. This transfer of wealth can be rationalized by managers wishing to deter a challenge from activist shareholders through a costly proxy vote. We find strong empirical evidence that managers respond to the presence of activists using MDPs, that MDPs constitute an effective wealth transfer to shareholders, and that activists are less likely to challenge management when an MDP is in place.