Naked Exclusion with Private Offers
研究卖方通过向买方提供排他性合同来阻止潜在进入者的能力，发现若买方无法观察彼此报价且持有被动或谨慎的信念，分而治之的排他策略会失效。
We consider a seller's ability to deter potential entrants by offering exclusive contracts to downstream buyers. Previous literature has shown that this can be a profitable strategy if there is a coordination failure on the part of the buyers or if the seller can make discriminatory “divide-and-conquer” offers. This literature assumes that all offers are public. We show that if buyers cannot observe each other's offers and have passive or wary out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the divide-and-conquer exclusion strategy fails. Equilibria in which the incumbent obtains exclusion due to a coordination failure, on the other hand, exist for all out-of-equilibrium beliefs.