A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
构建了一个包含无担保贷款和违约选项的一般均衡模型，模拟美国家庭在破产法第7章下的行为，并用该模型评估了引入破产“经济状况调查”政策的福利效应。
We study, theoretically and quantitatively, the general equilibrium of an economy in which households smooth consumption by means of both a riskless asset and unsecured loans with the option to default. The default option resembles a bankruptcy filing under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Competitive financial intermediaries offer a menu of loan sizes and interest rates wherein each loan makes zero profits. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize the circumstances under which a household defaults on its loans. We show that our model accounts for the main statistics regarding bankruptcy and unsecured credit while matching key macroeconomic aggregates, and the earnings and wealth distributions. We use this model to address the implications of a recent policy change that introduces a form of "means testing" for households contemplating a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. We find that this policy change yields large welfare gains. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.