Paying by Donating: Corporate Donations Affiliated with Independent Directors
研究发现，企业向独立董事关联的慈善机构捐赠（关联捐赠）规模大且隐蔽，此类捐赠会削弱独立董事的监督动机，导致CEO薪酬平均高出9.4%，且业绩不佳时CEO更不易被替换。
Abstract Corporate donations to charities affiliated with the board’s independent directors (affiliated donations) are large and mostly undetected due to lack of formal disclosure. Affiliated donations may impair independent directors’ monitoring incentives. CEO compensation is on average 9.4% higher at firms making affiliated donations than at other firms, and it is much higher when the compensation committee chair or a large fraction of compensation committee members are involved. We find suggestive evidence that CEOs are unlikely to be replaced for poor performance when firms donate to charities affiliated with a large fraction of the board or when they donate large amounts.