Cheap-Talk Referrals of Differentiated Experts in Repeated Relationships
研究客户与多位差异化专家在重复关系中，廉价谈话建议的有效性。发现完全诚实不可持续，专家越多诚实水平越差，但满足内部一致性的均衡可实现唯一诚实水平，且客户只需咨询一两位专家即可。
The effectiveness of cheap talk advice is examined in recurrent relationships between a customer and multiple experts who provide differentiated professional services. The main findings are: (i) Full honesty is not sustainable if the profitability of service provision varies widely across problems. (ii) As there are more experts due to finer specialization, the maximum equilibrium honesty level deteriorates. (iii) Nonetheless, the equilibria that satisfy an internal consistency condition, implement the same (unique) honesty level regardless of the number of experts. Furthermore, the customer can extract this honesty level by consulting a “panel” of only one or two (but no more) experts all the time.