Patent Licensing and Entry Deterrence: The Role of Low Royalties
研究了在位专利持有者如何通过设定低许可费来策略性地阻止潜在进入者，并分析了这种策略对市场集中度、价格和社会福利的影响，为反垄断政策提供了新启示。
We study how an incumbent patent holder can use licensing strategically to reduce the threat of further entry, through a low royalty. This licensing strategy deters entry by making the terms of future licensing agreements less favourable to potential entrants. Strategic licensing induces a trade‐off between a more concentrated market and a lower price. When this strategy is profitable for the patent holder, it is welfare enhancing if and only if the entry cost is high, or the efficiency edge of the technology is significant. Our analysis yields new policy implications (e.g. royalty floor) with respect to strategic licensing.