权责发生制会计系统的管理责任与估值含义

On the Stewardship and Valuation Implications of Accrual Accounting Systems

Journal of Accounting Research · 2013
被引 53
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了权责发生制如何影响盈余质量,从管理责任和估值两个角度分析,发现激进或保守的应计策略都能最大化会计质量,且这些策略对常用的盈余质量衡量指标有不同甚至不利的影响。

Abstract

In this paper we explore the role of accruals in determining “earnings quality” from both a stewardship and a valuation perspective. We show that the valuation and stewardship qualities of accrual accounting are maximized by either an “aggressive” or a “conservative” accrual strategy. Furthermore, accrual strategy choices can be delegated to management as it does not benefit by implementing a strategy that is not in the best interests of the shareholders. We also investigate the implications of accrual strategies for standard empirical measures of “earnings quality”: regression coefficients and R2s from price-earnings and market-to-book regressions. We show that such measures respond differently, and in some cases adversely, to the kind of strategies that make accounting constructs more correlated with the underlying economic activities of firms.

应计会计盈余质量会计稳健性会计激进性委托责任