Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions
研究了1997至2006年间欧盟各国政府对大型企业并购的反应，发现政府普遍偏好本国企业被国内而非外国收购，这种民族主义倾向在极右翼政党强大或政府弱势时更明显，并直接影响并购结果及后续外资进入。
ABSTRACT This paper studies government reactions to large corporate merger attempts in the European Union during 1997 to 2006 using hand‐collected data. We document widespread economic nationalism in which the government prefers that target companies remain domestically owned rather than foreign‐owned. This preference is stronger in times and countries with strong far‐right parties and weak governments. Nationalist government reactions have both direct and indirect economic impacts on mergers. In particular, these reactions not only affect the outcome of the mergers that they target but also deter foreign companies from bidding for other companies in that country in the future.