Economic Development and Relationship-Based Financing
研究了在资本禀赋不同的经济体中，关系型融资与正式金融的优劣转换，指出低资本时关系型融资最优，高资本时正式金融必要，但关系型融资可能持续存在并导致低质量企业家获资。
Formal finance involves the costly acquisition of information about distant entrepreneurs, while relationship-based finance allows financiers to fund a narrow circle of close entrepreneurs without acquiring costly information. In developing economies with low capital endowments, relationship-based finance is optimal because only high-quality entrepreneurs receive funding. However, formal finance may emerge in equilibrium, and it has the only effect of shifting rents from entrepreneurs to financiers. In more-developed economies with higher capital endowments, formal finance becomes necessary to prevent funding of low-quality entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, relationship-based financing may persist in equilibrium, and low-quality close entrepreneurs are funded even when there are high-quality distant entrepreneurs.