Directors' Informational Role in Corporate Voluntary Disclosure: An Analysis of Directors from Related Industries
研究发现，董事会中来自相关行业的董事越多，管理层盈利预测越准确，尤其在不确定性高时更明显，表明这些董事通过提供信息发挥咨询作用，而非监督作用。
ABSTRACT Boards of directors play their role in corporate governance by advising and/or monitoring managers. In the corporate disclosure literature, prior research has documented directors' monitoring role, yet empirical evidence on directors' advising role is limited. Since the advising role often entails information transfer, we examine directors who concurrently serve as directors or executives in the firms' related industries (DRIs) and hence possess valuable information about the firms' external operating environment. We hypothesize and find that more DRIs on boards are associated with more accurate management forecasts. This association is stronger when firms face greater uncertainty, and holds in settings where DRIs are unlikely to monitor managers, suggesting a distinct advising role of DRIs. Our study highlights directors' role as information suppliers and advisors who help shape corporate voluntary disclosure.