LEANING AGAINST WINDY BANK LENDING
利用包含银行的DSGE模型，发现美国大缓和时期货币政策对银行贷款增长有反应，但最优利率规则不对信贷增长做出反应，且实证反应带来的福利损失很小。供给冲击主导时，通胀与金融稳定之间存在权衡。
Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking, this paper first provides evidence that monetary policy reacted to bank loan growth in the United States during the Great Moderation. It then shows that the optimized simple interest‐rate rule features no response to the growth of bank credit. However, the welfare loss associated to the empirical responsiveness is small. The sources of business cycle fluctuations are crucial in determining whether a “leaning‐against‐the‐wind” policy is optimal or not. In fact, the predominant role of supply shocks in the model gives rise to a trade‐off between inflation and financial stabilization.