Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes
在社会偏好框架下解释动机挤出现象，引入“顺从者”类型，说明激励方案或自主权会传递委托人对社会规范的信念，高能激励可能因传达悲观信念而挤出动机，而固定工资或自主权则能传递信任。
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types, a third type of agent is introduced. These “conformists” have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do as well. When there is asymmetric information about the distribution of preferences (the “social norm”), the incentive scheme offered or autonomy granted can reveal a principal's beliefs about that norm. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or granting autonomy, trust in a favorable norm may be signaled.