STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH AN APPLICATION TO U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS
研究了不完全信息下非对称塔洛克竞赛模型的计量方法，建立了识别和估计参数的理论，并应用于美国众议院选举，量化了在位优势并评估了任期限制和竞选资金改革的影响。
Abstract We study the econometrics of an asymmetric Tullock contest model with incomplete information. Identification results are established for parameters in the asymmetric contest success function and for the quantile functions of players' private costs. We propose the corresponding estimators, derive the asymptotic properties, and demonstrate their good finite sample performances by simulation. We also propose an easy‐to‐implement parametric estimation method that can incorporate contest‐specific covariates. Our method is used to study U.S. House of Representatives elections. We quantify the incumbency advantages and conduct policy experiments to evaluate how imposing a term limit or launching campaign finance reforms affects incumbency advantage.