Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry
利用股票型共同基金董事持股的独特数据，分析董事激励结构是否与基金业绩相关。独立和非独立董事的持股都有显著影响，持股低的基金业绩明显较差。研究支持“利益不一致”机制，而非“私人信息”机制。
Abstract We use a unique database on ownership stakes of equity mutual fund directors to analyze whether the directors’ incentive structure is related to fund performance. Ownership of both independent and nonindependent directors plays an economically and statistically significant role. Funds in which directors have low ownership, or “skin in the game,” significantly underperform. We posit two economic mechanisms to explain this relation. First, lack of ownership could indicate a director’s lack of alignment with fund shareholder interests. Second, directors may have superior private information on future performance. We find evidence in support of the first and against the second mechanism.