Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets: An Application to the US Mortgage Market
研究了竞争市场中企业获取潜在客户信息的动机，发现企业会过度搜寻信息，且禁止价格歧视会导致高风险群体被拒率过高，进而引发严重的逆向选择问题。
How do price commitments impact the amount of information firms acquire about potential customers? We examine this question in the context of a competitive market where firms search for information that may disqualify applicants. Contracts are incomplete because the amount of information acquired cannot be observed. Despite competition, we find that firms search for too much information in equilibrium. If price discrimination is prohibited, members of high-risk groups suffer disproportionately high rejection rates. If rejected applicants remain in the market, the resulting adverse selection can be severe. We apply the results to the US mortgage market.