Board Composition and Corrective Action: Evidence from Corporate Responses to Bad Acquisition Bids
研究发现，独立董事比例高的公司在收购公告后股价大跌时更可能放弃交易，或对已完成的交易进行资产重组，说明董事会能根据市场信息采取纠正措施。
Abstract This study investigates the role of corporate boards following large declines in share value surrounding acquisition announcements. The results indicate that firms with independent boards are less likely to complete these value-decreasing bids, suggesting that boards influence corporate responses to information in stock prices. Board independence is also associated with unusually high frequencies of asset restructuring for bids that are completed, suggesting that independent boards promote restructuring in mergers the market believes are difficult to integrate. These results complement existing evidence on the board's exante role in averting bad outcomes by showing that independent boards intervene following value-decreasing events.