The Bright Side of Fire Sales
研究发现，在贱卖中收购资产的买方获得的超额回报比常规收购高2个百分点，原因是卖方议价能力下降；但贱卖对交易匹配质量和利益相关者的外部性影响有限，表明其福利损失小于先前预期。
Abstract Firms that buy assets in fire sales earn excess returns that are 2 percentage points higher than in regular acquisitions. The mechanism behind this result is the sellers’ reduced bargaining power. We find no difference in real effects or in the combined returns for buyers and sellers between fire sales and regular acquisitions, suggesting that the quality of the match is similar in both types of transactions. The externalities of fire sales for other stakeholders are limited. These results indicate that the welfare losses associated with fire sales are smaller than previously thought. Received December 17, 2015; editorial decision November 20, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.