Persuasion by Cheap Talk
研究了专家向决策者进行多维廉价谈话的可信度、说服力和信息量，发现偏好与状态无关的专家总能做出可信的比较性陈述，若其偏好为拟凸则廉价谈话具有说服力，并应用于产品推荐、投票、拍卖披露和广告等场景。
We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker. We find that an expert with state-independent preferences can always make credible comparative statements that trade off the expert's incentive to exaggerate on each dimension. Such communication benefits the expert—cheap talk is “persuasive”—if her preferences are quasiconvex. Communication benefits a decision maker by allowing for a more informed decision, but strategic interactions between multiple decision makers can reverse this gain. We apply these results to topics including product recommendations, voting, auction disclosure, and advertising.