Debt Heterogeneity and Covenants
研究发现，当借款人现有债务结构越异质，新债务合同中包含的契约条款越多，表明契约不仅用于解决股东与债权人冲突，还用于降低债权人之间协调失败的成本。
Coordination failure among owners of heterogeneous debt types increases distress costs. Covenants reduce expected distress costs by lowering the probability of liquidity shortages, increasing liquidation values, and incentivizing creditor monitoring. We predict and find that new debt contracts include more covenants when borrowers’ existing debt structures are more heterogeneous. Our findings suggest that covenants are not only used to address creditor–shareholder conflicts but also to reduce the expected costs of coordination failure among creditors. Furthermore, our results indicate a dynamic component missing from static debt structure models: Debt heterogeneity entails additional covenants (i.e., constraints) when raising future debt. This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance.