Investor Protection and the Long-Run Performance of Activism
用基金组织特征构建投资者保护指标，发现受保护更好的激进投资者攻击的公司年化收益高出约10%，且这种超额收益源于降低代理成本、改善治理和与其他机构合作，而非选股能力。
Using a parsimonious measure of investor protection constructed from fund organizational characteristics, this paper documents that companies targeted by activists with better investor protection structures outperform those targeted by those with poor investor protection structures by roughly 10% per year. The outperformance is observed only for active targets for which Schedule 13Ds are filed, not for passive Schedule 13G investments, indicating that the effect is not explained by a superior target-selection ability. The evidence suggests that funds with better investor protection achieve increased profitability and valuation ratio of their targets by reducing agency costs, improving corporate governance, and collaborating with other large institutional investors.