Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics
研究代理问题如何影响企业投资，并推导出最优投资与现金流、公司规模、资本结构和股利的关系，发现投资对当前和过去现金流正向敏感且存在正序列相关。
Agency problems limit firms' access to capital markets, curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual ways to mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment? We present a theory of a firm's investment dynamics in the presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financial contracts. We derive results relating firms' investment decisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure, and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasing in current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positively serially correlated over time (after controlling for investment opportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.